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Executive Summary 1
Executive Summary
Chicago has been the most aggres-sive city in the United States in the privatization of public infrastruc-
ture. Since 2004, the city has privatized 
the Chicago Skyway toll road, four 
downtown parking garages, and the city’s 
system of 36,000 parking meters, with 
only the recent financial crisis prevent-
ing the privatization of Midway Airport 
as well.
The recent privatization of city park-
ing meters has drawn particularly harsh 
public criticism as a result of rate hikes, 
equipment malfunctions and questions 
about whether the city received fair 
value.
The problems resulting from park-
ing meter privatization could have 
been avoided had Chicago followed 
common-sense principles regarding 
the privatization of public assets and 
provided the public with the ability to 
monitor and influence the privatiza-
tion process. Chicago must adopt strong 
public interest protections and embrace 
greater government transparency before 
any further privatization of public assets 
takes place.
The $1.16 billion parking meter 
privatization deal violated principles 
of good government, could lose money 
for Chicago over the long term, and has 
already resulted in negative impacts to 
drivers and the city’s neighborhoods.
•	 The idea for privatization of the city’s 
parking meters was originally con-
ceived of behind closed doors and 
months of preparatory work took place 
before the idea became public. The 
lead consultant to the deal received a 
no-bid contract. The City Council, 
which had already included expected 
revenues from privatization in the city 
budget, took only two days to approve 
the plan, and had minimal time to 
review the key documents. 
•	 Analysis by the city’s Inspector Gen-
eral suggests that the meter system 
would have been worth more to Chi-
cago had it remained in public hands. 
The Inspector General claims that 
the true value of the system to the city 
was greater than $2 billion using valu-
ation procedures common to privati-
zation proposals.
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•	 Since privatization of the city’s 
parking meters, meter rates have 
increased sharply, the meter system 
has malfunctioned several times, 
and drivers reportedly have shied 
away from using parking meters—
resulting in greater congestion on 
non-metered side streets and traffic 
problems for businesses in the city’s 
neighborhoods.
The process used to privatize Chi-
cago’s parking meters, like the city’s 
previous privatization efforts, contained 
serious shortcomings:
•	 Contract terms that increase the 
concessionaire’s profits by shifting 
risk onto the public, such as contract 
provisions preventing the city from 
opening parking meters or garages 
nearby even if such facilities would be 
publicly beneficial.
•	 No formal evaluation of impacts 
on the public interest and failure 
to obtain an independent financial 
analysis of the value of the asset to 
the city. 
•	 A closed-door process largely 
outside of the public eye, with no op-
portunity for public input and little 
outside scrutiny. 
•	 High transaction costs that under-
mine value while enriching deal 
makers. For the three privatization 
deals competed to date, the city paid 
more than $26 million in fees to law-
yers, accountants and other advisors, 
including investment banks such as 
Goldman Sachs. 
•	 Multi-generational leases. The 
deals for the Skyway, Midway Air-
port and the parking garages involved 
99-year leases, while the parking 
meter deal will last for 75 years. This 
time frame binds future generations 
of residents and city leaders far lon-
ger than future risks or problems can 
be anticipated.
To prevent future bad privatiza-
tion deals, the city of Chicago should 
embrace public interest principles for 
protecting the public, adopt rules and 
processes to ensure that privatization 
proposals receive a thorough vetting 
prior to a decision, and embrace a com-
mitment to government transparency.
The city should ensure that any future 
privatization deals adhere to the following 
principles: 
• The public should retain control over 
decisions that affect the broader public 
interest. 
• The public must receive full value so 
future revenues are not sold off at a 
discount. 
• No deal should last longer than 30 
years because of uncertainty over 
future conditions, because the risks 
of a bad deal grow exponentially over 
time, and because long contracts 
transfer unnecessary control to the 
concessionaire. 
• Contracts should require state-of-the-
art maintenance and safety standards 
instead of statewide minimums.
• There must be complete transparency 
to ensure proper vetting of privatiza-
tion proposals. 
•	 There must be full accountability in 
which the elected legislative body 
must approve both the authority to 
negotiate a deal and any terms of a 
final deal. 
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In addition, the city should adopt procedural 
safeguards for future privatization proposals 
that include the following:
• A minimum waiting period of 30 
days between publication of the final 
terms of a privatization agreement 
and a vote (45 days for privatization 
of assets or services valued at more 
than $50 million). 
• Competitive, transparent bidding for 
all professional services provided dur-
ing the privatization process and for 
the privatization contract itself.
• Disqualification of city councilors 
from voting on privatization propos-
als when they have received campaign 
contributions from companies that bid 
on a given asset or performed profes-
sional services related to privatization. 
The Mayor’s office should similarly 
reject contributions from such com-
panies and publicize contributions 
received for a defined period prior to 
the decision to consider privatizing  
an asset.
• Thorough, independent analysis of 
the valuation of assets proposed for 
concession agreements along with a 
comparison of privatization with other 
alternatives (including the option of 
bonding against future revenues with 
the same schedule of user fee increases 
without a private lease or transfer of 
ownership).
• Prompt public disclosure of all 
documents related to privatization bids.
• Clear directions for how proceeds 
from the sale will be allocated, along 
with the development of tools to 
enable the public to track spending 
of proceeds from privatization over 
time. These tracking tools should be 
integrated into a city-wide budget 
transparency Web site that would en-
able citizens to have “one-stop” access 
to all city expenditures.
• Timely public disclosure of all docu-
ments relevant to a privatization 
proposal, including posting of such 
documents on a publicly accessible 
Web site.
Finally, to bolster confidence, trust, and 
transparency in government, Chicago should 
follow the example of a growing number of 
cities and states that provide detailed and up-to-
date searchable information about government 
contracting and expenditures on-line. 
Specifically, the city should create a 
one-stop, comprehensive, on-line database 
that would enable citizens to obtain infor-
mation on contracts, the current status 
of city accounts, special tax breaks, fee 
services accrued, economic development 
subsidies and city budgets. The Web site 
should provide summary information and 
enable residents to drill down to detailed 
information on city payments, including 
the city’s check register. The Web site 
should also retain previous years’ data for 
comparison. 
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Chicago has a long reputation for back-room deals and political corruption. In 2006, the Chicago Sun-Times tal-
lied 79 elected officials in Chicago, Cook 
County or Illinois who had been found 
guilty of a crime since 1972—a rate of more 
than two per year.1
Chicago has worked hard in recent years 
to change its reputation. Residents want to 
turn the page on machine politics and dirty 
dealing to become a metropolis known for 
good governance and positive innovation. 
City officials have sought to foster the view 
of Chicago as an innovative city, casting the 
recent wave of privatization agreements for 
public infrastructure as a step in the right 
direction.
While the payoffs from earlier priva-
tization deals have received little public 
scrutiny, the recent privatization of the 
city’s parking meters has sparked public 
outrage. As parking rates quadrupled 
overnight in some parts of the city and 
meters malfunctioned, critics—including 
the city’s own Inspector General—argued 
that the city received hundreds of millions 
of dollars less for the meter system than it 
was worth.
All of these factors have led some street-
wise Chicagoans to wonder what was really 
behind the privatization deal. The fact that 
the city spent millions of dollars on consul-
tants hired via no-bid contracts to arrange 
the deal, provided inadequate time for the 
City Council to assess the plan by rushing 
consideration in only two days, and offered 
the public no way to scrutinize the deal or 
have an opportunity to be heard add to the 
sense of suspicion.
For a city that is trying to land the 
Olympic Games, attract new businesses 
and residents, and put its reputation for 
shady deals behind it, the parking me-
ter controversy comes at precisely the 
wrong time. There is one way, however, 
that the city can turn recent events to 
its advantage—by taking action to join 
national leaders in embracing thoughtful 
principles for evaluating privatization 
deals and by implementing innovative 
state-of-the-art tools for government 
transparency. 
It may be too late to undo parking 
meter privatization. But it is not too 
late for Chicago to apply its reputation 
for municipal innovation to the task of 
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informing citizens about the operations of 
government and involving them in setting 
its direction. Similarly, just as Chicago has 
been aggressive in pushing infrastructure 
privatization, it can also become a national 
leader in protecting the public through 
privatization safeguards—helping other 
cities who wish to follow the city’s example 
to avoid its mistakes.
This report reviews Chicago’s experience 
with privatization and suggests a number 
of common-sense steps the city can take to 
protect the public from bad privatization 
deals and improve government transparency 
more generally—steps that ensure a role for 
citizens in determining the future of the 
assets they own as taxpayers and rely upon 
as consumers. 
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Chicago is “ground zero” in the growing national debate over the privatization of public infrastruc-
ture. No city in the nation has moved as 
aggressively toward privatization—with 
such key pieces of city infrastructure as 
the Chicago Skyway, Midway Airport 
and the city’s system of parking meters 
put up for bid. 
Chicago’s experience demonstrates 
both the attraction and the risks of infra-
structure privatization. 
The Lure of Privatization 
Privatization of public assets can provide a 
quick boost to government budgets in the 
form of large, upfront payments. These 
payments can be used to fill short-term 
budget caps, such as the massive deficits 
facing Chicago and many other cities. 
Privatization, at least in theory, can also 
shift public-sector risks to private com-
panies and may, in some circumstances, 
improve the efficiency with which services 
are delivered. 
High Upfront Payments
The greatest draw of privatization for 
many cash-starved cities and states is the 
prospect of an immediate infusion of cash 
into government coffers without the need 
to increase taxes. The long-term lease of 
a revenue generating facility can bring in 
huge cash payments—for example, the 
$1.16 billion received for the 75-year lease 
of the city’s system of parking meters is 
equivalent to nearly 20 percent of the $6 
billion in total revenue the city was expect-
ing to receive from all sources in 2009.2
Cities can use the revenue from priva-
tization deals for a variety of purposes, in-
cluding improving their long-term financial 
standing. Chicago, for example, has used 
revenues from privatization deals, in part, 
to pay down city debt, thus avoiding future 
debt service payments and improving the 
city’s short-term credit rating, enabling the 
city to borrow money more cheaply in the 
future. The city has also used privatization 
revenue to create a capital fund for park 
improvements—thereby reducing the need 
to bond for those improvements.
In addition, the city has used some of 
the revenue to plug short-term budget 
gaps, to invest in social programs, and to 
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provide ongoing revenue to programs that 
had been supported by revenue from the 
privatized assets. 
Shifting of Risk
A second argument made by advocates of 
privatization is that it involves shifting 
risk from government to the private sec-
tor. While many privatization contracts, 
including those in Chicago, limit the risk 
faced by private-sector entities in impor-
tant ways (see page 26), there are several 
types of risks that are presented as shift-
ing to the private entity when an asset is 
privatized.
Political Risk
One argument made for privatization 
is that it shifts “political risk” related to 
unpopular decisions. Unlike government 
officials, private-sector executives cannot 
be voted out of office. Privatizing public 
assets therefore politically insulates public 
officials by shifting the blame to private 
companies that subsequently raise fees or 
take other unpopular actions. Public of-
ficials can find it very attractive to avoid 
public accountability for such decisions.
Risk of Future Capital Investment
Another risk supposedly transferred in 
privatization deals is the obligation to 
undertake unforeseen repairs or improve-
ments to infrastructure. Chicago’s recent 
privatization deals include requirements 
that the new private-sector owners rebuild 
the East Monroe Street Garage and replace 
existing coin-fed parking meters with “pay 
and display” meters. Chicago is presumably 
already paying for these foreseeable capi-
tal expenses by accepting a lower upfront 
payment than the city would have received 
for the assets without this obligation. In 
transferring the assets to the private sec-
tor, Chicago also avoids the potential extra 
costs if repairs were more expensive than 
anticipated, although this determination is 
also likely reflected in the level of upfront 
payment. However, the city also avoids the 
possible benefits if new technologies or 
other advances would make such repairs 
less costly. 
Risk of Lost Income
Privatization advocates argue that a final 
risk is avoided through privatization: the 
risk that assets that are money-makers for 
What Is Privatization?
The term “public-private partnership” is frequently used to describe deals such as the lease of the Chicago Skyway or the city’s parking meter system. The term, 
however, is imprecise. Public-private partnerships of one form or another are ubiq-
uitous throughout government—from the subcontracting of cleaning services in 
government buildings to the wholesale sell-off of government functions.
The term “privatization” can be a more precise term. In this paper, we define 
privatization agreements as those that involve the long-term lease of a publicly held 
asset that conveys rights tantamount to ownership, including the right to generate 
revenue from the asset. Privatization can also refer to the granting of permission 
to private entities to build new assets in areas traditionally managed by govern-
ment—for example, construction of a new toll road.
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the city now will cease to be money-mak-
ers years or decades down the line. For 
example, while a private operator would 
reap windfall profits if passenger traffic at 
Midway Airport booms, or more people 
drive the Skyway, or the demand for park-
ing increases; the operator will make less 
money if the opposite takes place. With 
privatization, Chicago has already man-
aged to secure some return on its assets, 
regardless of future demands for them. 
Again, however, the risk of declining in-
come in future years is likely factored the 
upfront payment received by the city. (See 
“Putting a Price Tag on Public Assets,” 
page 14.)
Perceived Increased Efficiency of 
Private Sector Operators
In some cases, public officials may be 
lured by perceptions that private sector 
companies are inherently more efficient 
in managing assets than the government. 
Mayor Richard Daley made this argument 
in blunt fashion in February 2009, stating 
that “We [the city] can’t compete with the 
private sector. The private sector has a 
complete idea of who your customers are. 
Government doesn’t have customers. They 
only have citizens.”3
There are some functions that can be 
contracted for more efficiently by the 
private sector. But there is no evidence 
suggesting that the private sector is in-
herently more efficient at running public 
infrastructure. First, increased operational 
efficiencies are rarely even mentioned by 
investors as a financial opportunity for 
privatization deals. Moreover, Chicago’s 
privatization agreements have generally 
included protections for city workers that 
eliminate labor shedding, which is the most 
obvious form of potential cost savings. 
Indeed, a Government Accountability Of-
fice report that examined states’ programs 
to contract out engineering and other 
highway work to private firms found that 
it was “difficult to conclude that the use of 
consultants and contractors is more or less 
expensive than using public employees over 
the long term.”4
Potential Pitfalls of  
Privatization
Without proper safeguards, privatization 
can also pose significant and long-term 
threats to the public interest. Among the 
dangers of privatization are the following:
Loss of Public Control Over  
Key Infrastructure
Governments and private entities have 
different goals in mind when it comes to 
managing public facilities. For govern-
ment, the primary objective is (or should 
be) to serve the broader public interest. For 
private entities, the primary objective is to 
maximize profit.
These goals often come into conflict. 
For example, the operator of a toll road 
might decide that it can maximize its profit 
by increasing tolls—even if the toll increase 
results in fewer vehicles using the road. If 
the cars and trucks deterred by higher tolls 
are instead driven on local streets or on 
free, government-run highways, the result 
can be increased traffic and wear-and-tear 
on those roads and decreased quality of life 
for local residents—impacts that harm the 
broader public interest.
Privatization agreements typically in-
clude provisions that deter governmental 
actions that will erode the value of a priva-
tized asset—for example, by forbidding 
government from building publicly owned 
facilities that would compete for customers, 
or by forcing government to compensate 
the private operator when governmental 
actions threaten to reduce revenue. These 
non-compete and compensation clauses re-
duce the ability of government to respond 
to the future needs of its citizens.
In addition, privatization agreements 
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typically include schedules that stipulate 
the amount that the private operator can 
charge in tolls or other fees for years—if 
not decades—to come. By signing a priva-
tization agreement, the government gives 
away the power to delay or defer fee hikes, 
even if it is necessary to protect the public 
interest.
Failure to Receive Full Value  
for the Assets
Supporters of privatization often claim that 
private entities can operate facilities more 
efficiently than government. However, 
privatization imposes a series of added costs 
that make it unlikely that taxpayers will 
receive the full value for privatized assets. 
For example, private companies have 
higher long-term borrowing costs than 
governments. According to analysis by 
Dennis Enright at the investment bank, 
NW Financial Group, in 2007 public 
sector costs for raising capital through 
debt were a full 35 percent less than the 
lowest cost a private entity could hope to 
obtain.5 Other academic studies confirm 
these consistently higher private capital 
costs.6 Lenders understand that, especially 
over the long-term, government default 
is far less likely than potential company 
bankruptcy.
The impact of the private sector’s higher 
cost of capital must be reflected in one of 
two ways: either lower upfront payments 
for public assets, or higher user costs such 
as tolls and parking fees. Upfront payments 
from private firms, while large enough 
to entice many budget-weary politicians, 
typically do not match the value that the 
government would gain over the long term 
by keeping the asset in public hands and 
charging the same level of tolls or fees (See 
“Putting a Price Tag on Public Assets,” 
page 14.)
In addition, private entities must return 
profits to their shareholders and investors. 
Publicly owned facilities are generally not 
operated to skim off a profit from users, or 
to channel surplus funds into other public 
services (although some generate revenue 
for government coffers as a side benefit). 
By contrast, privatized assets must set user 
fees high enough to not only cover the cost 
of operations and maintenance but also pay 
for the compensation of shareholders and 
executives. 
Finally, privatization deals create signifi-
cant legal and monitoring costs for state 
or local governments. For governments 
to avoid unintended consequences, they 
must hire lawyers and analysts to conduct 
asset valuation, performance monitoring, 
and contract enforcement. The city paid 
Goldman Sachs $9 million for financial 
advice on the Chicago Skyway deal, for 
example, and has made similar large pay-
ments to other professional service firms 
that have assisted in the preparation of 
privatization deals.7 Under a private deal, 
additional inspectors, financial experts 
and lawyers would be needed throughout 
the contract term to interpret the contract 
and potentially litigate to ensure that a 
private operator is upholding the terms of 
the deal.  
Long Contracts that Obligate and 
Constrain Future Generations
The loss of control and lost value from 
privatization are greatly compounded by 
the fact that privatization contracts often 
extend many decades into the future. Pri-
vate investors prefer deals that are at least 
50 years long, because that length allows 
them to qualify for large tax subsidies 
predicated on a transfer of ownership. 
While concessionaires seek the tax ben-
efits, they may not necessarily desire the 
responsibility of ownership. 
To appreciate how profound future 
changes will be over these time frames, 
consider these transportation-related mile-
stones: Henry Ford introduced the Model 
T in 1908, 101 years ago and Congress 
created the interstate highway system in 
1956, 53 years ago. Similarly, population 
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changes during these time periods can 
be dramatic. Metropolitan areas have 
doubled their populations in the course 
of a few decades, creating huge changes 
in transportation needs. Massive, unfore-
seeable changes will likely take place for 
transportation technology, demographics, 
and the distribution of population over a 
multi-generational timeframe. In the face 
of such uncertainties, governments cannot 
predict future needs accurately enough to 
negotiate a deal that fairly allocates risks, 
dictates policy, or sets a fair price.
No contract can be crafted well enough 
to solve these problems. Even the most 
public-minded elected officials with the 
best lawyers and consultants cannot draw 
up a lease or concession contract that will 
predict the public’s needs and contingen-
cies in the distant future. For this reason, 
contracts that seek to predict future events 
which are inherently unpredictable can 
be associated with a need to renegotiate 
when unanticipated circumstances occur. 
Ambiguities in the future interpretation of 
a contract under unforeseen circumstances 
may have huge stakes and may need to be 
litigated. 
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Chicago has the most experience of any American city with the privatization of public assets. Beginning with the 
lease of the Chicago Skyway in 2005, the 
city has privatized city parking garages and 
parking meters, and attempted to privatize 
Midway Airport. Chicago’s experience 
shows that the risks of privatization to the 
public interest are very real—particularly 
when key decisions are made outside of the 
public’s view. 
Previous Chicago  
Privatization Deals
Chicago Skyway
Payment: $1.8 billion
When: 2005
Who: Cintra-Macquarie
Length: 99 years
The 2005 lease of the Chicago Skyway to 
the Cintra-Macquarie consortium was the 
first long-term lease of an existing toll road 
in the United States. 
Completed in 1958, the Skyway connects 
the Indiana Toll Road with the Dan Ryan 
Expressway. For many years, the Skyway 
was a mismanaged white elephant, even 
defaulting on the bonds used for its con-
struction.8 More recently, however, the 
Skyway had become a money-maker for 
the city, generating approximately $30 
million in revenue annually from 1998 to 
2002.9 Indeed, by the late 1990s, Skyway 
revenue was helping to underwrite bonds 
used to pay for other citywide transporta-
tion projects.10
In 2004, the city opted to solicit bids 
for privatization of the Skyway. In an open 
bidding process, Cintra-Macquarie of-
fered $1.8 billion for a 99-year lease of the 
road—twice as high as the nearest bid and 
much more than city officials were expect-
ing.11 Revenue from the Skyway lease was 
intended to fund a series of long-term and 
short-term city priorities, including:
• Retirement of $453 million in existing 
Skyway debt;
• Retirement of $392 million in city debt;
• Investment of $500 million in a 
Privatization in Chicago: 
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long-term reserve, the interest from 
which can be used to augment city 
revenues.
• Dedication of $375 million to a short-
term annuity to pay for city operating 
expenses (which expires in 2011).
• Dedication of $100 million to short-
term social service programs (which 
expires in 2009).12
The most direct impact of the privatiza-
tion on Skyway users was higher tolls. Tolls 
on the Skyway have already increased from 
$2 prior to privatization to $3 today.13 The 
maximum toll level is scheduled to increase 
by 50 cents every two years, with tolls 
reaching $5 for cars by January 2017.14 Be-
yond 2017, the privatization agreement al-
lows Cintra-Macquarie to increase tolls by 
the rate of growth in inflation or per-capita 
gross domestic product (GDP), whichever 
is greater, or by at least 2 percent.15 Over 
the 87 years between 1921 and 2008, nomi-
nal per-capita GDP in the United States 
increased nearly 70-fold.16 
The amount paid for the Chicago Sky-
way was more than city officials were ex-
pecting, and it may have been higher than 
Cintra-Macquarie could sustain.17 Mac-
quarie has since written down the value of 
its investment in the Skyway—slashing its 
valuation by 20 percent during 2008.18 In 
2008, traffic on the Skyway dived by 7.1 
percent, although revenue from the road 
increased by 3.3 percent due to higher 
tolls.19
In addition to the higher-than-expected 
price the city received for the Skyway, the 
Skyway privatization deal also did not 
include a “non-compete” clause, meaning 
The Chicago Skyway was the first U.S. toll road to be privatized. Credit: Thomas Frederick Banks
Privatization in Chicago 13
that the city is able to improve free high-
ways and public transportation options in 
the corridor without paying compensation 
to the Skyway’s owner.20 
The key question in evaluating the Sky-
way deal and other privatization deals is 
not whether the city could have obtained a 
larger upfront private payment or whether 
the deal is better than other privatization 
contracts. Rather, the important question 
is whether the city and its residents would 
be better off privatizing the road than 
maintaining ownership itself.
In the case of the Skyway, some analysts 
suggest that investors can still expect a 
substantial return on investment, even 
under conditions of low traffic growth, 
solely from their ability to increase tolls 
and obtain public tax subsidies.21 Were the 
city to have proceeded with toll increases of 
similar magnitude to those allowed under 
the contract with Cintra-Macquarie, it is 
likely that the city could have generated 
even greater long-term revenue than it 
received in the Skyway deal. (See “Putting 
a Price Tag on Public Assets,” page 14.)
The Chicago Skyway was, in many 
ways, the ideal resource for the city to 
privatize and it chose to privatize it at the 
ideal time. The Skyway is used largely by 
out-of-state commuters. There are com-
peting free highways that offer drivers a 
(less convenient) alternative to the Skyway 
if they were to balk at higher tolls. The 
privatization also took place at a time when 
investors were prepared to offer generous 
terms as they sought out new opportunities 
for investment.
Still, there are legitimate questions 
about whether privatizing the Skyway was 
a good idea, given the potential for the city 
to generate similar or greater revenue from 
the resource over time. 
Downtown Parking Garages
What: Four downtown parking garages 
(Grant Park North and South, East Mon-
roe Street and Millennium Park)
Payment: $563 million
When: 2006
Who: Consortium led by Morgan  
Stanley
Length: 99 years
Chicago’s renowned park system draws 
visitors from across the city and around 
the world. To improve access to the parks 
for the age of the automobile, the Chicago 
Park District opened the Grant Park North 
garage in 1953. Over the ensuing decades, 
the Park District would open a second 
garage at Grant Park, as well as garages 
at East Monroe Street and Millennium 
Park. Together, the four garages account 
for more than 9,000 parking spaces in the 
heart of Chicago.23 
The parking garage system not only 
increased access to the parks and other 
attractions in downtown Chicago, but it 
also acted as a revenue source, providing 
roughly $5 million per year for the park 
system.24 
In 2006, the Park District’s garages 
were privatized in a complex, three-way 
deal between the district, the city, and a 
consortium led by Morgan Stanley. In es-
sence, the Park District transferred title to 
the garages to the city, which then leased 
them to the concessionaire. Of the $563 
million paid for the 99-year lease on the 
garages, $208 million was used to pay off 
bonds from the construction of Millen-
nium Park, while the Park District received 
the remainder of the money, minus trans-
action costs.25 In addition to the upfront 
payment, the concessionaires committed 
to shouldering the estimated $65 million 
cost of rebuilding the East Monroe Street 
garage.26
The $348 million Park District share 
of the transaction went toward paying off 
bonds for the parking garages, funding 
the reconstruction of Daley Bicentennial 
Plaza following the rebuild of the East 
Monroe Street garage, providing a $122 
(continued page 16)
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Putting a Price Tag on Public Assets
Assessing the value of a public asset over several generations is difficult. There are two specific challenges: the difficulty of estimating future risks and the 
need to come up with a correct present-day valuation for revenues that will be 
received decades into the future.
The prospect of dramatic technological change makes it difficult to assess 
either the upside or downside risk of an asset lease. For example, if, 75 years from 
now, the car is supplanted by some other form of transportation, the value of 
the Chicago Skyway or the city’s downtown parking garages will be less than it 
is today. (Although these assets may have value for other purposes that the city 
would be unable to unlock if the assets are in private hands.) Conversely, changes 
that would increase the use of an asset or increase the rates that could be charged 
for its use would tend to lead to higher values over the long term.
In addition, the value of an asset today depends critically on how much or how 
little one values revenues that will be received in the distant future. A dollar in 
revenue received today is more valuable than a dollar received five, 10 or 75 years 
down the road, because the dollar received today could be invested to yield greater 
returns in the future. 
In economics lingo, the degree to which a dollar in revenue next year is per-
ceived to be less valuable than a dollar received today is known as the “discount 
rate.” For a long-term lease on a piece of public infrastructure, the selection of 
the discount rate is a critical factor in estimating the value of the infrastructure 
in present-day terms. 
Consider an example of an asset that is expected to generate a net revenue 
stream of $100,000 each year in perpetuity. At a discount rate of 5 percent, the 
present-day value of $100,000 in revenues in year 25 of the investment is just 
over $29,000. In other words, exchanging $29,000 today is worth a payment of 
$100,000 to be received 25 years in the future. The present-day value of $100,000 
in revenues to be received in year 75 is only $2,575. For the revenue stream as a 
whole, the net present value—the present-day value of all future revenues under 
this scenario—totals to just under $2 million.
By contrast, consider the same scenario, but with an assumed discount rate of 10 
percent. Under that assumption, the present-day value of $100,000 of revenue in 
year 25 is only $9,200—less than a third of what it was with a 5 percent discount 
rate. The present-day value of $100,000 in year 75 is only $79. Thus, the net pres-
ent value of all future revenues totals just under $1 million, or half of what it was 
with a 5 percent discount rate. (See Figure 1 for an illustration.)
The importance of the discount rate in valuing public assets was underscored 
in the Chicago Inspector General’s report on parking meter privatization. The 
Inspector General calculated the value of the system under three different dis-
count rates—the one used by the federal government when it sells public assets 
(approximately 5-5.5 percent), one produced by a leading model used in valuing 
public-private partnerships that incorporates future risks (7 percent), and the one 
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used by the city’s consultant on the deal, which assumed the higher cost of private 
capital (10 to 14 percent). 
The results are startling. Using the 7 percent discount rate, the net present 
value of the parking meter system was estimated at between $1.7 billion and $2.6 
billion (with the variation depending on assumptions about future parking meter 
rates and utilization). By contrast, the city received only $1.16 billion in upfront 
payments for the meter system, a “good deal” based on the city consultant’s valua-
tion of the asset.22 These calculations were used to support the Inspector General’s 
widely reported claim that the parking meter system would have been worth $974 
million more to the city had it remained in public hands. 
(For more discussion of the valuation of the city’s parking meters, see “The 
Payout,” page 21.)
The Inspector General’s report illustrates an important point about public asset 
privatization—the fact that a public asset may fetch a lower private sale price than 
the value it would deliver if it remained in public hands. As a result, it is entirely 
possible that the city of Chicago may have gotten the best possible deal on its as-
sets in the open market—and at the same time secured less value from those assets 
than would have been the case had they remained in public hands under the same 
terms as existed in the various lease agreements.
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million capital fund for neighborhood 
park capital improvements, and creating 
a long-term income reserve fund that will 
provide roughly $5 million per year to the 
Park District to offset the loss of parking 
garage revenue.27
The most immediate and visible result 
of privatization of the parking garages—as 
was the case with the Skyway—was an 
increase in user fees. Rates at the Park 
District garages, once among the most af-
fordable options for parking in downtown 
Chicago, increased significantly. Rates at 
the Millennium Park garage, for example, 
increased by nearly 40 percent.28 Unlike 
the Skyway lease agreement, the contract 
to lease the four parking garages set no 
limits on the rates the concessionaire 
could charge for parking, on the theory 
that the garages already face competition 
from numerous privately owned garages 
in the Loop.
The long-term implications of the lease 
are more questionable. The investment of 
$122 million in a capital fund for neigh-
borhood park improvements should save 
the Park District the need to bond capital 
improvements, reducing debt service obli-
gations while providing needed improve-
ments around the city. 
The $5 million income provided by the 
long-term fund, while it compensates for 
the loss of parking revenue in the short 
term, will come to be worth less and less 
over time, driving the Park District to dip 
into the fund’s principal or to find new 
sources of revenue. Indeed, curbs in prop-
erty tax revenue have already forced the 
Park District to tap $10 million in interest 
from the capital improvement fund and the 
fund set aside for reconstruction of Daley 
Bicentennial Plaza.29 In addition, the Park 
District has sought to tap new revenue by 
converting 4,000 formerly free parking 
spaces along the waterfront to metered 
parking and increasing rates at existing 
The city leased its publicly owned downtown garages, including the one at Millennium Park 
(above), for $563 million in upfront payment. Credit: Steve Geer, Istockphoto.com
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pay spaces.
As with the Skyway lease agreement, 
the city spent large sums on professional 
services to make the deal happen. In total, 
$7.5 million was spent on legal, financial 
and professional services, more than 1 
percent of the total upfront payout for the 
garages.30
Midway Airport (canceled)
Payment: $2.5 billion
When: Privatization was approved by the 
City Council in 2008, but the deal was 
scrapped in 2009 when investors could not 
come up with financing.
Who: Consortium including Citi Infra-
structure Investors, YVR Airport Services 
Ltd., and John Hancock Life Insurance 
Company
Length: 99 years
Chicago’s first airport, Midway, plays an 
important role in connecting the Chicago 
region to the rest of the nation, serving as a 
center for low-cost airlines and a convenient 
option for travel close to the city’s center. 
Midway has also served in recent years as 
an important revenue-generating asset for 
the city, netting approximately $8 million 
in operating revenue in 2006.31
The drive to privatize Midway Airport 
began in earnest in 2006, when the Illinois 
Legislature passed legislation to allow for 
privatization of the airport. A proposed 99-
year lease for the airport was announced 
to the public in September 2008. Just eight 
days later, the City Council approved the 
lease arrangement, with no public hearings 
and little detailed information provided to 
the public.32 The quick approval was said 
to be necessary in order to obtain approval 
for the deal from the federal government 
before the Bush administration left of-
fice.33 The deal later collapsed, however, as 
the concessionaires were unable to secure 
financing.
Midway would have been the United 
States’ first privatized major airport. The 
upfront payment would have been $2.5 
billion, but approximately half of that 
Midway Airport would have been the first large U.S. airport to be privatized, but the deal fell through 
in the midst of the recent financial crisis. Credit: Carl Lukasewich, www.carlsville.com
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amount—$1.1 billion—would have been 
used to pay off bonds used to finance capital 
improvements at Midway, including the 
major renovations completed earlier this 
decade.34 An additional $225 million was 
dedicated to the costs of providing police 
and fire service at the airport over the 
first 20 years of the agreement.35 Of the 
remaining approximately $1 billion to be 
paid to the city, 90 percent was required by 
law to be used for infrastructure projects 
and paying off the city’s pension deficit, 
leaving approximately $100 million for 
other projects.
The Midway deal would have come 
with continuing obligations for the city, 
particularly the need to provide police 
and fire protection. Indeed, the cost of 
providing police and fire protection over 
the 99-year term of the lease could have 
exceeded $1 billion.36 
Unlike the Skyway and parking garage 
deals, which did not require outside ap-
proval, the Midway deal was required to 
meet the conditions established by the FAA 
for its pilot airport privatization program. 
Among the FAA requirements were the 
approval of the lease by 65 percent of the 
air carriers using the airport.37 Because the 
airlines—particularly Midway’s largest 
carrier, Southwest—held the fate of the 
agreement in their hands, they received 
generous treatment under the agree-
ment, including lower airport charges 
and substantial control over future capital 
improvements at the airport.38 Airline fees 
to the airport were to have been capped for 
the first six years of the agreement, with 
increases over the next 19 years limited to 
the rate of inflation, not including levies for 
approved capital improvement projects.39
The ultimate impact the Midway deal 
would have had on travelers was unclear. 
The limitations on the increases in airline 
fees, combined with the continuing pres-
ence of competition from airlines flying 
out of O’Hare, meant that travelers were 
unlikely to see much impact in the prices 
of airline tickets. However, there was 
speculation that consumers might see high-
er prices for parking and for concessions. 
Because the fees paid by airlines would 
have been restricted under the deal, and 
because there is little room for additional 
development at the Midway Airport site, 
concessions—which accounted for nearly 
half of Midway’s operating revenue in 
2006—and parking would have been the 
main avenues for increasing revenue from 
the facility.40 
The privatization agreement was ap-
proved by the Chicago City Council in 
late 2008, but the consortium’s difficulty 
in obtaining financing for the purchase led 
to the plan being delayed and ultimately 
scuttled. 
The Midway deal itself would have pro-
duced a short-term financial boost for the 
city, even as the city retained responsibil-
ity for providing public safety services at 
the airport over the long term. Ironically, 
however, the collapse of the deal provided 
a financial windfall for the city, as Chicago 
got to keep $126 million in upfront money 
provided by the concessionaires.41
Parking Meter Privatization: 
A Bad Deal Done Badly 
What: The city’s system of 36,000 park-
ing meters
Payment: $1.16 billion
When: 2008
Who: Morgan Stanley Infrastructure 
Partners
Length: 75 years
No city privatization deal has generated 
the same amount of public attention—or 
outcry—as the 2008 decision to lease 
Chicago’s system of parking meters to a 
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consortium led by Morgan Stanley. The 
early months of privatized parking meters 
were a debacle. Rates went up, quadrupling 
in some places, hours when drivers had to 
pay were lengthened, and malfunctions—
ranging from jammed meters to meters 
with incorrect rate information—were 
common.
City drivers have responded with 
outrage—avoiding parking their cars at 
meters, organizing protests, and even en-
gaging in outright sabotage.42 
What is so different about the parking 
meter deal that it has created such a strong 
public outcry, while previous deals have not 
engendered widespread opposition?
The difference is not in the basic struc-
ture of the deal itself. Indeed, the parking 
meter deal follows the same basic tem-
plate as all previous Chicago privatization 
deals—the city received a large upfront 
payment in return for a long-term lease 
of a revenue-generating asset. The terms 
of the deal allowed the private operator 
to increase rates on consumers, generally 
within limits. The city is deterred from 
“competing” with the privatized service 
(e.g., by setting up cheaper meters else-
where). And the revenues from the sale 
are directed toward a mix of short-term 
projects and long-term funds intended to 
produce investment revenue the city can 
use for years to come.
What made the parking meter deal 
especially problematic—even by the stan-
dards of previous deals—was the nature of 
what was privatized. The Skyway, Midway 
Airport and the downtown parking garages 
could all be considered “non-core” assets 
of the city. Each facility provides impor-
tant public services, and each generated 
revenue to support other functions of city 
government. But many city residents could 
go months, years, or even decades without 
using any of those facilities. And in some 
cases, such as the Skyway, the main users 
of the facility reside outside of Chicago’s 
city limits. 
The parking meter system, on the other 
hand, touches the lives of most Chicago 
residents—many of them on a daily basis. 
With more than 36,000 meters, the city’s 
metered parking system includes four times 
as many spaces as the city’s four now-
privatized downtown parking garages. 
The greatest concentration of metered 
spaces is downtown, but metered spaces 
exist in many of the city’s wards. By reason 
of the system’s size and extent, the impact 
of parking meter privatization was always 
going to be more deeply felt than previous 
privatization efforts.
Moreover, regulation of curbside park-
ing is a major element of transportation 
policy—a central function of city govern-
ment. Curbside parking, as any Chicagoan 
knows, is a scarce resource. Without park-
ing meters, drivers would be free to occupy 
choice parking spaces at no cost for hours 
or days at a time—making it hard for 
shoppers or others making quick stops at 
local businesses to find convenient places 
to park. 
Setting the right prices, time limits, and 
hours of operation for curbside parking is 
no simple matter. Despite the inevitable 
complaints from drivers when parking 
meter rates rise, charging more for parking 
can be a good thing—encouraging would-
be drivers to walk, bike or take public 
transit instead of driving, and promoting 
faster turnaround of parking spaces to re-
duce the amount of time drivers must spend 
“cruising” for a spot. This is particularly 
true in the Loop, where public transporta-
tion options abound. On the other hand, 
however, setting rates too high in a given 
area can discourage people from shopping 
or doing business in city neighborhoods, 
encourage drivers to seek free parking on 
side streets, or push drivers to “chance it” 
by parking illegally. 
Cities face similar difficult decisions 
in determining where to put parking me-
ters—or answering the more fundamental 
question of the degree to which the city’s 
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valuable “curbfront property” should be 
devoted to the storage of cars as opposed 
to bike lanes, bus stops, wider sidewalks or 
other urban amenities. 
The amount of money parking me-
ters generate for city coffers, therefore, 
is but one of many competing factors in 
determining how the city’s parking meter 
system should be run—and, arguably, 
should be among the less-important factors 
influencing those decisions. As a result, any 
privatization deal must not only deliver 
financially for the city’s taxpayers but must 
also deliver benefits for the broader public 
interest if it is to be judged a success. 
How did Chicago end up in its park-
ing meter mess? And what have been the 
ramifications?
The Process
As with other privatization efforts, the 
city’s parking meter leasing scheme was 
initiated behind closed doors. Reportedly, 
the idea for privatizing parking meters 
emerged not from city officials but from 
William Blair & Company, a consultant 
that had been paid millions of dollars for 
its work with the city on previous privati-
zation deals and would eventually bill the 
city more than $4 million for its work on 
parking meter privatization.43
The city began exploring a deal to priva-
tize the parking meters during the summer 
of 2007, but the plan was first announced to 
the public in early 2008 as the city opened 
its process for seeking qualified bidders 
from private firms interested in running 
the system.44 In April, the city sent out 
an information packet to bidders with the 
outlines of the proposed lease—including 
the city’s proposal to increase parking rates 
dramatically.45 The city finalized the pro-
posed lease agreement in September and 
solicited bids. In October, anticipating the 
meter lease, the city included $150 million 
in proceeds from the anticipated sale in the 
city’s budget—creating intense pressure 
to complete a deal at a time of a growing 
budget crunch because failing to do so 
would force critics of meter privatization 
to propose substantial tax increases or cuts 
in other city services that would otherwise 
be seen as avoidable.46
In late November, the city received 
formal bids for the meter privatization 
and on December 2 the city announced 
that a Morgan Stanley-led consortium 
was the high bidder. The deal was then 
hustled through the City Council with 
little information or time for public debate. 
There were no public hearings and no in-
dependent analysis of the deal assessing the 
pros and cons of leasing the meters. Impor-
tantly, there is no indication from the city’s 
official timeline of events that the city ever 
formally considered alternatives other than 
privatization for the city’s parking meter 
system—such as bonding against future 
meter revenue while retaining ownership of 
the system or contracting out the manage-
ment of the system for a set fee.47
Aldermen were not provided with 
a copy of the ordinance approving the 
lease—which, including the contract itself 
and attachments, ran to 277 pages—until 
the morning that the Finance Committee 
approved the deal, on December 3. The 
next day, December 4, the City Council 
approved the lease deal by a vote of 40-5, 
committing the city to a 75-year lease of 
its parking meter system.48 By February, 
the deal had been closed and control over 
the meters turned over to the consortium, 
with the day-to-day operation of the system 
taken over by LAZ Parking.
The process for the parking meter lease 
was similar to that employed in previous 
privatization agreements. While aldermen 
and the public had less time to consider 
the deal than previous agreements, the 
difference was not great (two days versus 
one to two weeks for previous deals). The 
most important parts of the process—the 
drafting of the privatization agreement in 
particular—took place almost entirely out 
of the public eye. There was no formal 
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process for evaluating or publicizing the 
costs and benefits of the parking meter 
privatization plan—either for the city’s 
finances or the public interest as a whole. 
And there was no formal way for the pub-
lic—even if it had been given the tools to 
assess the impact of the deal—to make its 
voice heard and influence the outcome.
The result is a deal that Chicagoans 
will have to live with for the next several 
generations—or pay dearly to escape. 
The Payout
The city received $1.16 billion for the park-
ing meter lease. The proceeds were divided 
among a mix of short-term spending and 
long-term investments. Specifically, funds 
were allocated as follows:
• $400 million for a long-term  
reserve/reinvestment fund (which is 
anticipated to provide $20 million  
per year to replace lost revenue from 
the meters)49
• $325 million in “mid-term budget 
relief” to help cover city deficits 
through 2012 (of which $100 million 
has already been used, with another 
$50 million used in 2009)50
• $100 million to a human infrastruc-
ture fund for social programs
• $320 million in a “budget stabilization 
fund” that could be used if the reces-
sion proves to be deeper or longer than 
expected.51 This entire “rainy day fund” 
could be drained by the end of 2010.52
Of the $1.16 million payout, then, only 
$400 million will likely remain available to 
the city beyond the next several years. As 
was the case with the parking garage priva-
tization deal, the estimated $20 million in 
annual revenue provided from the long-
term reserve/reinvestment fund will help 
replace parking meter revenues in the city’s 
budget in the short term, but could lose 
value over time due to inflation. Eventually, 
the city will need to replace revenue that 
would have been gained through increases 
in parking meter rates with revenue from 
other sources, such as taxes. 
One of the most controversial ques-
tions regarding the parking meter deal 
is whether the city received full value for 
the resource. The city’s Inspector General 
criticized the privatization agreement as a 
“dubious financial deal,” claiming that the 
parking meter system was likely worth at 
least $2 billion to the city over the term of 
the agreement.53 City officials criticized the 
findings on the grounds that the inspec-
tor general placed greater value on meter 
revenues in the distant future than was 
warranted.54 
Who is correct? The simple answer is 
that we’ll know for sure in 75 years. There 
is, however, ample reason to be skeptical 
about whether the city received its money’s 
worth.
The city’s defense of the privatization 
deal hinges on the notion that the pri-
vate sector delivered something that the 
public sector couldn’t deliver—either in 
the form of higher meter rates that bring 
in more revenue, better meters operated 
with greater efficiency, or a better deal on 
financing. 
Higher meter rates – In the case of 
higher meter rates, the city’s case is that 
the city would not have had the political 
will to embrace a rate hike of similar size 
without privatization—in other words, that 
the city is receiving revenue from the meter 
privatization deal that it would not have 
received otherwise. Indeed, the city had not 
increased rates at some meters in decades 
and previous discussions of meter rate in-
creases had been met with strong reserva-
tions from elected officials. However, the 
city did impose a major rate increase as part 
of the privatization deal. It is hard to imag-
ine that the negative reaction to a similar 
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rate increase would have been any greater 
than the hostile reaction provoked by the 
privatization deal. Finally, as the Inspector 
General’s report pointed out, several other 
cities have imposed rate increases of similar 
size without privatization.55
Advanced meters –Another argument, 
presented by the city’s consultant in the 
meter deal, William Blair & Company, is 
that the capital improvements made to the 
meter system—specifically the installation 
of “pay and display” meters—would have 
been difficult for the city to finance itself.56 
Without privatization, the argument goes, 
the city would have continued to rely on 
coin-fed meters indefinitely. However, the 
city did have alternative ways to finance 
meter modernization, which brings in-
creased revenue into the system. It could 
have chosen to issue general obligation 
bonds, thus obtaining capital far more 
cheaply than a private investor could. Or it 
could have issued revenue bonds secured by 
parking meter revenues, as the city of San 
Francisco has done for many years. In any 
case, the new pay and display meters, while 
paid for by the concessionaire, are not a 
“free” bonus in the deal. On the contrary, 
they have either already been paid for in a 
lower upfront payment than the city would 
have otherwise received, or will be paid for 
in the form of increased meter fees paid by 
Chicago drivers. 
In terms of operational efficiency, as 
mentioned earlier, private companies enjoy 
no inherent advantages in the operation of 
public infrastructure. Even if they did en-
joy such advantages, the annual operating 
cost of the meter system is only approxi-
mately $4 million—a small fraction of the 
nearly $22 million in revenue brought in 
by the system in 2006.57 Even a dramatic 
reduction in operating costs would only 
provide a relatively small increase in the 
amount of additional net revenue produced 
by the system—and nowhere near the 
amount of additional revenue generated by 
the recent rate hikes.
Financing –Finally, the city’s consultant 
argues that a similar deal would have been 
difficult or impossible to finance without 
privatization. The consultant claims that 
the issuance of $1 billion in bonds secured 
by parking meter revenue would result in 
bonds that sold at prohibitive double-digit 
yields, “if they could be sold at all.”58 
The argument made by the consultant 
suggests that the private-sector bidders 
for the parking meter system could secure 
financing at lower expense than the city 
could under the same conditions (i.e., with 
the rate hikes in place). Such a circum-
stance would be highly unusual—as noted 
above, governments are nearly always able 
to borrow money less expensively than pri-
vate sector actors. (See page 9.) Few would 
argue, for example, that the city of Chicago 
is inherently more risky than Morgan Stan-
ley, which, it should be recalled, was the 
beneficiary of a federal bailout just weeks 
before submitting the winning bid for city’s 
parking meter concession. 
Even if the consultant is correct that the 
city would not have been able to finance the 
same deal under the same terms, that is not 
to say that the city could not have financed 
a different deal under more beneficial terms. 
Among the consultant’s reasons for argu-
ing that the Inspector General’s higher 
valuation of the parking meter system was 
incorrect was that the Inspector General 
understated the riskiness of the deal for 
the private investors, with two leading 
contributors to that risk being the large size 
of the deal and its 75-year length.
Instead of choosing a long-term lease 
for all of the system’s revenues, the city 
could have chosen a shorter-term lease, or 
to issue bonds off of a part—rather than 
all—of the city’s parking meter revenue, 
thereby reducing the risk and enabling the 
city to get a better interest rate on the deal. 
The city of San Francisco has pursued this 
approach for years, issuing bonds secured 
by parking meter revenue to fund the con-
struction of parking garages.59 
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Finally, unlike previous privatization 
deals, the parking meter lease deal did not 
result in a reduction in the city’s long-term 
debt obligations—thereby improving the 
city’s financial standing. The deals for the 
Skyway and the parking garages, and the 
failed deal for Midway Airport, all involved 
the retirement of substantial amounts of 
debt tied to those facilities. On the con-
trary, the parking meter deal threatens to 
harm the city’s long-term financial stand-
ing by diverting a stable source of fund-
ing—parking meter revenues—from the 
city’s general fund. 
In summary, while the financial win-
ners and losers of the parking meter deal 
can’t be known for decades, there is ample 
reason for skepticism that the city received 
full value for the meter system. As the 
Inspector General’s report suggests, the 
parking meter system was likely worth 
more to the city if it had remained in public 
hands than as a privatized asset. And the 
city could have achieved similar results, 
with less long-term risk, if it had leased the 
meters for a shorter term or found a way to 
monetize the value of the meters without 
privatizing them. 
The financial impact of the parking 
meter deal, however, is just part of the 
story. Even if the city were to have received 
financial gain from the privatization, the 
other impacts of the deal may have made it 
a losing proposition for Chicagoans.
The Impacts
Higher Rates and Longer Hours
Parking meter rates increased immediately 
upon the transfer of the city’s parking 
meters to the private entity. Meter rates in 
the city’s neighborhoods increased from 
between 25 and 75 cents per hour to $1 per 
hour. Meters in central business districts 
outside of the Loop doubled in cost from 
$1 to $2 per hour, while meters within 
the Loop increased from $3 to $3.50 per 
hour.60 Rates are scheduled to continue to 
increase over the next several years—by 
2013, meters in neighborhoods will cost 
$2 per hour (an increase of between 167 
to 700 percent versus rates in place prior 
to privatization), while business-district 
meters will cost $4 per hour and meters in 
the Loop $6.50.61
Along with higher rates have come 
longer hours of operation. The days of 
free Sunday meters and meter holidays are 
largely over. Now, most meters through-
out the city will operate from 8 a.m. to 9 
p.m., seven days a week, with meters in 
the Loop operating 24 hours a day (albeit 
at discounted rates during the overnight 
hours).62 The Inspector General’s report 
estimates that the new meter policies will 
add 35 million hours of parking meter 
operation each year, creating additional 
opportunities for the private entity to gain 
revenue from the meters.63
The city has argued that parking meter 
rates prior to privatization were too low, 
and that rates at many meters had not been 
increased in 20 years. Indeed, there are 
good reasons why Chicago might want to 
increase meter rates—to encourage the use 
of transportation alternatives, perhaps, or 
to encourage faster turnaround of parking 
spaces so as to discourage “cruising” for 
spaces, which wastes fuel and contributes 
to traffic congestion.64 But the schedule 
of rate increases included in the privatiza-
tion plan is inflexible (the city must pay 
compensation to the concessionaire if it 
opts not to move forward with the rate 
increases) and does not appear to be have 
been grounded in any serious analysis of its 
impact on the transportation system.
In essence, the privatization deal marked 
a paradigm shift from one in which park-
ing meters were mainly an instrument of 
transportation policy (and only incidentally 
a money-raiser) to one in which parking 
meters are primarily a cash cow. With the 
privatization deal, Chicago has already 
milked that cow for the next several gen-
erations.
Higher rates and extended hours have 
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not only sucked more money out of Chi-
cagoans pockets, but have also changed 
the way drivers are using (or not using) 
metered parking spaces. (See “Impacts on 
Businesses and Neighborhoods,” below.)
Equipment Malfunctions
The transition to private management of 
the city’s parking meters was anything 
but smooth. Following the rate increase, 
drivers complained that many meters had 
incorrect rate information, while many 
meters became jammed with quarters once 
the new, higher rates took effect.65
The privatization contract requires the 
concessionaire to replace traditional coin-
fed meters with “pay and display” meters 
once the rate in a given area exceeds $1.50 
per hour. However, even the new machines 
have experienced problems. In May, an out-
age blamed on a “computer glitch” disabled 
some new pay-and-display machines, lead-
ing Chicago police to cease writing parking 
tickets for the day.66
In response to the operations break-
downs this spring, city workers were forced 
to help fix problems with the meters, billing 
the concessionaires for the expense.67 
Also hampering the operation of meters 
has been a wave of vandalism, as drivers 
frustrated by the new parking meter system 
took matters into their own hands.68
Impacts on Businesses and  
Neighborhoods
One result of the increase in rates and gen-
eral outrage about the parking meter deal 
is a sharp drop in the utilization of meters. 
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of 
metered parking spaces being left vacant 
as drivers scramble to take advantage of 
the limited free spaces available on side 
streets across the city. During City Coun-
cil hearings held in early July, at least two 
aldermen complained that many meters 
in their wards remain empty—a situation 
that was drawing complaints from local 
businesses.69 According to one Albany 
Park businessman, interviewed by NBC5 
News, “You start looking out the window 
and there are less and less cars parked. 
And there’s less customers coming in.”70 
The change in operating hours for many 
meters across the city has forced some 
residents—including those who may have 
enjoyed free parking on Sundays or in 
the evening—to change their habits. The 
overflow of cars from drivers seeking to 
avoid metered spaces, meanwhile, threatens 
to increase congestion on side streets with 
free spaces.
Under the now-privatized system, the 
concessionaire bears the financial risk of 
reduced parking meter utilization. But it is 
the city’s drivers and businesses that bear 
the public policy risks of abandoned meters in 
shopping districts and crowded residential 
side streets. 
Vandalism of city parking meters spiked in 
the wake of the privatization deal. Credit: Josh 
Wellington
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Loss of Control Over Transportation 
Policy
Among the biggest downsides of the priva-
tization of parking meters in Chicago has 
been the loss of control over transportation 
policy. 
Recall that the primary role of parking 
meters is not to make money for the city. 
Rather, it is to promote effective trans-
portation policy, ensuring the turnover 
of parking spots in business districts, 
discouraging drivers from “cruising” for 
parking, and the like. Rules regarding the 
placement, rates and hours of operation of 
parking meters can have a significant effect 
on the ease with which Chicagoans can 
get to work, shop, visit family and friends, 
and even maintain a comfortable lifestyle 
as city residents.
As such, it is dangerous for a city to 
become reliant on parking meters for 
revenue, particularly when those revenues 
are directed to the city’s general fund (as 
was the case in Chicago), as it increases 
pressure to see meters as a cash cow, rather 
than as an instrument of sound transporta-
tion policy. 
City officials strenuously contend that 
the parking meter privatization deal has 
not resulted in the city ceding control over 
transportation policy. They argue that the 
city retains control over the public way 
and that the privatization agreement vests 
with the city the ability to dictate parking 
rates, meter location and hours of opera-
tion. Moreover, while the city must pay the 
concessionaire compensation if changes to 
the meter system were to reduce revenues, 
city officials argue that the situation is no 
different than the situation prior to priva-
tization, when the city would also have had 
to account for lost meter revenue.71
However, privatization of the city’s 
parking meter system has had the effect of 
raising the price tag on future changes. The 
higher rates and longer hours of operation 
included in the privatization agreement will 
more than double the amount of revenue 
brought in by the parking meter system.72 
An April 2008 analysis by William Blair & 
Company, the consultant that developed 
the deal, found that the greatest increase 
in revenue will come not from parking 
meters in the Loop, but rather in the city’s 
outlying neighborhoods, where meter rates 
quadrupled overnight.73 The compensation 
the city will be forced to pay the conces-
sionaire for removing meters will therefore 
be much greater than it would have been 
prior to the rate increases—especially in 
the city’s neighborhoods.
Making changes to the system appear 
even more costly is the fact that the city of 
Chicago has already received the revenue 
from higher parking meter rates as part of 
the upfront payment it got from the priva-
tization deal. If the city were to remove 
parking meters, or make other adjustments 
that cut into revenue, it must essentially pay 
the concessionaire back. 
The threat of having to pay compensa-
tion for changing the location, pricing or 
hours of operation of meters is already 
hanging over the heads of city decision-
makers. As reported in the Chicago Reader, 
one alderman, unhappy with the extension 
of hours of operation for meters in his ward, 
inquired with the city about restoring the 
old hours of operation for 270 meters. 
The cost, he was told by the city’s Depart-
ment of Revenue, would be $600,000 over 
three years. The alderman dropped the 
proposal.74
The requirement to pay compensation 
for the removal of meters limits the city’s 
flexibility in changing the use of some of 
the city’s most valuable real estate—the 
“curbfront property” on its streets. 
The concession contract also cedes con-
trol over public policy in other ways:
•	 Enforcement: The contract assumes 
that the city will continue to enforce 
parking laws—including the city’s 
vehicle immobilization policy (the 
“boot”)—in substantially the same 
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manner that it had prior to privatiza-
tion. The city is contractually re-
quired to boot the vehicles of parking 
ticket evaders and to pursue license 
suspensions, even when tickets are 
issued by the private operator. The 
contract even stipulates the maximum 
number of notification letters the city 
can send to violators before booting 
their vehicles (three) and the amount 
of time that can elapse before the city 
refers unpaid tickets to a collection 
agency (180 days).75 In addition, the 
contract requires the city to pay com-
pensation to the concessionaire if the 
fine for a parking violation falls below 
a certain ratio in comparison to the 
hourly parking rate.76 The city must 
even compensate the concessionaire 
if meters are taken out of operation 
for emergency parking bans, snow 
closures, street closures or construc-
tion for more than a certain number 
of days in the year.77
•	 Non-compete clause: The contract 
also states that the city “will not 
operate” and “will not permit the 
operation of” a new competing public 
parking facility, including off-street 
lots or garages within one mile of a 
concession parking space, unless it 
charges rates at least three times high-
er than those in place at the metered 
spots. There are some exceptions to 
this—including park-and-ride lots, 
lots supporting affordable housing, 
and those at sports stadiums or used 
for special events.78 In general, how-
ever, the agreement sharply limits the 
city’s ability to expand public parking 
outside of the concession, should it 
become appropriate to do so.
No Way Out
As public outrage over the parking meter 
situation has reached a boiling point, many 
Chicagoans have asked why the city can’t 
just get out of the deal. The problem is that 
the terms of the agreement make it very 
difficult for the city to escape—at least 
without paying a hefty price.
Revocation of the agreement would at 
least require the city to pay “fair market 
value” for the remaining value of the con-
cession, as well as any additional expenses 
imposed on the concessionaire stemming 
from the early termination.79 The city also 
could be open to a lawsuit.
Given that a significant amount of the 
upfront money paid to the city in the priva-
tization deal has already been spent, Chi-
cago would need to dig deep to buy back a 
parking meter system that it had just sold 
off. And because the city negotiated an ex-
tremely long-term lease for the meters—75 
years—city residents could instead be stuck 
with the deal for generations.
Common Elements of  
Chicago Privatization Deals
Privatization of the city’s parking meters 
may hold the most profound implications 
for the city’s future of any of the privati-
zation deals considered thus far. But, as 
noted earlier, the process by which the 
parking meter deal was developed and 
approved and the actual structure of the 
deal itself were not substantially different 
from previous privatization deals. Indeed, 
the city’s privatization deals share several 
characteristics:
•	 Contract terms that limit conces-
sionaire’s risk. The city must pay the 
concessionaire compensation if it takes 
actions that reduce income to the 
concessionaire—for example, by en-
tering the Skyway to conduct repairs 
on neighboring roads or to do utility 
work. The city’s privatization con-
tracts shield the concessionaire from 
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certain future changes in the tax code, 
including the imposition of a leasehold 
tax, which could trigger the termina-
tion of the agreement and require the 
payment of compensation by the city. 
In the case of the Skyway contract, 
the concessionaire is also protected 
from the risk of a force majeure (col-
loquially known as an “Act of God”) 
that would destroy or render parts of 
the Skyway unusable, by enabling the 
concessionaire to raise tolls or extend 
the term of the agreement to recover 
lost revenue.80 Finally, both the con-
tracts for the parking garages and the 
parking meters include non-compete 
clauses that prevent the city from 
opening similar facilities nearby, even 
if they are deemed necessary to serve 
the public interest.
•	 No formal evaluation of impacts 
on the public interest and failure 
to obtain an independent financial 
analysis of the value of the asset to 
the city. Chicago has not undertaken 
important evaluations to ensure that 
its privatization deals are in the best 
interests of the public or the city. A 
report by the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) noted that 
the city did not undertake rigorous 
tests of how the Skyway deal would 
affect broader aspects of the public 
interest, such as impacts on local com-
munities and regional mobility.81 In 
addition, the city did not undertake 
a financial evaluation that compared 
the value of the privatization deal with 
the value to the city of keeping the 
asset in public hands with the same 
toll hikes. The lack of an indepen-
dent financial analysis that compared 
the benefits of private versus public 
ownership was a critical shortcoming 
of the process used for privatization of 
the city’s parking meters—a deficien-
cy highlighted by the city’s Inspector 
General.82 Such evaluations must take 
place in order to ensure that the public 
interest is safeguarded in any privati-
zation deal. 
•	 A process that takes place largely 
outside of the public eye, with no 
opportunity for public input and 
little outside scrutiny. In each of the 
city’s privatization efforts, the ini-
tial stages of development took place 
behind closed doors. In the case of 
the Skyway, privatization was under 
discussion and development for several 
years prior to the issuance of a formal 
request for qualifications in March 
2004.83 Only 16 days elapsed between 
the due date for final bids and the City 
Council’s approval of the winning bid 
for the Skyway in October 2004.84 
The timeline for approval of later 
privatization deals was even shorter—
eight days in the case of the Midway 
Airport deal and just two days for the 
parking meter deal. In each case, there 
were no formal public hearings that 
would have enabled city residents to 
voice their opinions—or raise ques-
tions—about the potential impacts of 
privatization. 
•	 High transaction costs that cut into 
the value of the deal. The city has 
hired a variety of legal and financial 
advisors to structure its privatization 
deals and usher them to completion. 
For the three deals completed to date, 
the city has paid more than $26 mil-
lion in fees to lawyers, accountants 
and other advisors.85 In the case of 
the Skyway, these advisors cost $12 
million. The investment bank, Gold-
man Sachs, received the lion’s share of 
these funds, taking away $8.4 million 
in consulting contracts.86 Not only 
are these fees expensive, but in some 
cases, the city has secured the services 
of these advisors outside of the normal 
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bidding process, leading to questions 
about the potential for conflicts of 
interest.87
•	 Multi-generational leases. The deals 
for the Skyway, Midway Airport and 
the parking garages involved 99-year 
leases, while the parking meters deal 
will last for 75 years. In each case, by 
negotiating such long-term deals, the 
city has given itself limited options 
for getting out of an agreement if it 
were to prove disadvantageous, and 
has saddled future generations with 
the prospect of privatized assets, even 
though the revenues from the sale of 
those assets will likely have been spent 
long before. 
These shortcomings are not the in-
evitable by-product of privatization deals. 
Indeed, there are jurisdictions that pursue 
a more careful and rational approach to 
privatization—and that have tools for guar-
anteeing the transparency of governmental 
decision making in all areas, including 
privatization of public assets.
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As the experience of privatizing Chicago’s parking meters has demonstrated, there 
are major risks involved in privatization deals, 
and bad deals can burden a city for generations 
to come. At the same time, the city’s experi-
ence with privatization has shone a spotlight 
on the lack of transparency and accountability 
in city government more generally.
To prevent future bad privatization 
deals, the city of Chicago should embrace 
thoughtful principles for asset privatiza-
tion, adopt rules to ensure that privatiza-
tion proposals receive a thorough vetting 
before they are adopted, and embrace a 
commitment to government transparency 
more generally. City and state governments 
across the country provide examples of 
how privatization can be handled in a more 
transparent and effective way—and how 
cities and states can provide greater trans-
parency in all aspects of government.
A Thoughtful Approach  
to Privatization
The decision to privatize a public asset is an 
important one with long-term implications 
for the taxpayers and government as 
a whole. It is critically important that 
jurisdictions considering asset privatization 
do so carefully and according to principles 
that put the broader public interest ahead 
of the desire for a short-term infusion of 
money.
Principles for Privatization
Any proposed privatization of a public 
asset should be done with goals in mind 
that extend beyond maximizing the 
initial payout for the asset. Specifically, 
there are six principles that governments 
should use in evaluating privatization 
proposals: 
The public should retain control over 
decisions that affect the broader  
public interest. 
Governments invest in building infra-
structure with broad public interest goals 
in mind. For example, a city may build 
a parking garage to encourage tourists 
to visit the city or to correct a market 
failure in which private entities provide 
too little parking. The fact that these as-
sets generate revenue is a nice bonus to 
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taxpayers, but not the primary reason for 
the initial investment.
As such, any deal to privatize a public 
asset must ensure that the public retains 
control over uses of that asset that affect 
the broader public interest. The Chi-
cago parking meter privatization deal, 
for example, explicitly retains the city’s 
control over the use of public ways and 
gives the city permission to establish the 
location, rates and hours of operation of 
parking meters. The structure of the deal, 
however, imposes financial costs for the 
exercise of that authority, creating serious 
obstacles to making policy in the public 
interest.
The public must receive fair value so 
future revenues are not sold off at a 
discount. 
Public officials—particularly during times 
of budgetary stress—face extreme pres-
sure to meet their budgets without raising 
taxes or cutting services. Long-term asset 
privatization deals can provide a quick 
fix, delivering an immediate infusion of 
funds while deferring the consequences 
until well after current public officials 
leave office. 
That is why it is critical that there be 
close scrutiny of the terms of privatiza-
tion deals to ensure that the public gets 
fair value for the asset. In particular, 
there must be independent, third-party 
valuation of the resource to be privatized 
that compares the likely price that could 
be received for the asset on the open 
market with the value of keeping the asset 
in public hands with the same allowable 
fee schedule sought by the private entity. 
It is also important that privatization be 
compared with other options—including 
monetization of future revenue and the 
privatization of management functions 
without a transfer of ownership—so 
that decision-makers can choose among 
several viable options for achieving their 
goals.
No deal should last longer than 30 
years because of uncertainty over  
future conditions and because the 
risks of a bad deal grow exponentially 
over time. 
Multi-generational time frames—such 
as 75 or 99 years—are common in priva-
tization agreements because they allow 
private companies buying public assets to 
gain preferential tax treatment. However, 
these terms bind future generations to the 
consequences of decisions made by today’s 
political leaders. The Chicago Inspector 
General, in his report on the parking me-
ter privatization, noted that the city had 
several options for pursuing shorter-term 
leases of the meter system that could have 
generated significant revenue while reduc-
ing the long-term risks of a bad deal.88
Contracts should require state-of-the-
art maintenance and safety standards 
instead of statewide minimums. 
It is likely that great technological changes 
will occur between now and the time that 
today’s concession contracts have ended, 
75 to 99 years from now. 
Currently, concession contracts come 
with detailed and elaborate operating 
standards that lay out in detail exactly how 
the asset should be maintained and man-
aged. The concession agreement for the 
Chicago Skyway, for example, includes a 
226-page manual of operating standards 
that details the criteria for proper main-
tenance and operation of the Skyway.89 
However, it is impossible for any manual 
or contract to anticipate all future condi-
tions. For example, the Skyway operating 
standards include a requirement that the 
concessionaire operate a Web site with 
consumer information—a requirement 
that would certainly not have been a part 
of the operating standards had they been 
written 15 years ago. The Skyway agree-
ment does give the city the right to update 
the standards to reflect new laws or the 
most recent practices adopted by other 
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governments operating similar highways.90 
Further changes, however, must be paid for 
by the city and could trigger the payment 
of compensation to the concessionaire. 
The Midway Airport concession deal, 
which ultimately fell through, included 
a provision required under the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s pilot privatiza-
tion program that assures that “safety and 
security at the Midway Airport Facility 
will be maintained at the highest possible 
levels.”91
There must be complete transparency 
to ensure proper public vetting of 
privatization proposals.
The process of privatizing a public asset 
must take place in the open from begin-
ning to end. The public should be aware 
of every step that is taken in pursuing a 
privatization proposal—from the initial 
hiring of a consultant to develop a valuation 
to the development of a draft agreement to 
the solicitation of proposals to the selec-
tion of a winning bidder. The selection of 
vendors should take place according to a 
jurisdiction’s open bidding laws, and there 
should be a strong presumption that all 
information gained during the privatiza-
tion process be made public. Legitimately 
proprietary information such as traffic 
analysis studies may be restricted for a few 
years from general public disclosure, but 
some public entity rather than the com-
panies themselves must judge what docu-
ments deserve to be treated as proprietary. 
There should also be a proper amount of 
time allotted, including time for public 
hearings and ample time for review of the 
proposed agreement, before a privatization 
agreement is finally approved.
There must be full accountability in 
which the governmental body must 
approve both that a deal be negotiated 
and the terms of a final deal. 
Legislatures or city councils must be in-
volved at two stages of the privatization 
process—the decision to solicit bids under 
particular terms and the acceptance of a 
final deal. It is not good enough for leg-
islators to approve the authority to solicit 
bids and then avoid being counted in terms 
of their position on a final deal. In other 
words, elected officials must have the abil-
ity to both shape the terms under which 
assets may be privatized and to approve 
the final deal that is presented to them. 
Transparency is also critical to avoid both 
corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption, thereby helping to assure public 
legitimacy for any privatization deal.
Who Is Getting It Right?
There are some jurisdictions that have 
applied these principles to privatization 
proposals, producing results that are more 
legitimate in the public eye and that result 
in greater benefits for the public.
Public Interest Tests
As noted earlier, public infrastructure is 
built not primarily to make money but 
rather to achieve other public interest 
goals. As a result, efforts to privatize public 
assets should be rigorously evaluated in 
order to ensure that privatization protects 
the broader public interest.
Among industrial nations, Australia has 
perhaps the most experience with privati-
zation of public infrastructure. The Aus-
tralian state of Victoria subjects proposed 
public-private partnerships to a series of 
tests designed to evaluate whether they are 
in the public interest, including evaluations 
of the proposed project’s:
• effectiveness in meeting specific pub-
lic policy goals
• accountability and transparency
• impact on affected individuals and 
communities
• equity, in the sense that it provides for 
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disadvantaged groups to also make use 
of the infrastructure
• guarantees of public access
• protections for consumer rights
• safety and security
• protection of privacy92
While some of these criteria are more 
applicable to certain privatization proposals 
than others, these are the minimum criteria 
by which projects should be evaluated. 
Assuring Fair Value: Comparing the 
Alternatives
In the case of the parking meter privatiza-
tion proposal, aldermen were called upon 
to make a single up-or-down vote on a 
plan, the revenues from which were already 
included in the city’s budget. Other ideas 
for generating revenue from the parking 
meter system while maintaining city own-
ership—from raising rates to contracting 
out the day-to-day operation of the system 
to securitizing future revenue from the 
meters—were apparently never considered, 
and were certainly not pursued as serious 
options.
No government entity should pursue a 
long-term privatization agreement without 
considering all of the available options 
for meeting its public policy goals. When 
governments take the time to undertake a 
thorough, rigorous analysis of privatiza-
tion, they often come to the conclusion 
that options other than full privatization 
make sense.
The state of Oregon, for example, de-
veloped a model that compared the costs of 
a public-private partnership with the costs 
of pursuing a project as a public endeavor. 
They determined that the added costs of 
the public-private partnership were not 
worth the risk transferred from the public 
to the private operator.93 
Similarly, Harris County, Texas, con-
ducted an evaluation that examined several 
different models for the future of its toll 
road system, including privatization. The 
analysis concluded that there was little 
to gain from a long-term lease and the 
county ultimately maintained control of 
the asset.94 
Foreign governments considering priva-
tization conduct similar analyses, evalu-
ating whether entering a public-private 
partnership creates value for the public 
compared with other alternatives.95
By undertaking rigorous analysis of 
privatization proposals and comparing 
them with other alternatives for manage-
ment of those resources, cities and states 
can make sure that they are taking actions 
that are in the long-term public interest.
Limiting the Length of Privatization 
Agreements
Governments can also impose specific lim-
its on the length of concession agreements 
with an eye toward avoiding committing 
future generations to the ramifications of 
a privatization contract. In 2007, Texas, 
which has had a great deal of experience 
with infrastructure privatization, adopted 
legislation that limits the terms of conces-
sion agreements to 50 years.96 
European countries, which have exten-
sive experience with infrastructure priva-
tization, now generally limit the length of 
concession agreements to 21 to 35 years, 
compared with earlier contracts of 75 to 99 
years.97 An evaluation of European prac-
tices produced for the U.S. Department of 
Transportation explained that contracts of 
this length correspond with “the accepted 
lengths of government bonds, commercial 
mortgages, and reasonable risk assessments” 
(emphasis added).98 Some countries, such 
as England and France, are considering 
requiring infrastructure concessions to be 
renegotiated every 7.5 years to ensure that 
the agreements do not deliver excessive 
profits to the private entities.99 The evalu-
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ation recommended that the United States 
adopt contract lengths of 30 to 35 years for 
similar projects.
Transparency in the Privatization 
Process
To ensure that the public has the ability 
to scrutinize and voice its opinion about 
privatization proposals, all aspects of the 
privatization process should be open to 
the public.
In early 2009, citing Chicago’s ex-
perience, the city of Pittsburgh began 
exploring privatization of its system of 
city-owned parking garages. Pittsburgh 
officials, however, have thus far followed a 
markedly different and more transparent 
path in their exploration of privatization. 
First, the city’s mayor announced publicly 
that he was considering privatization.100 
The city clearly, and from the very begin-
ning, identified how it would use the pro-
ceeds from the sale: to bail out the city’s 
pension fund. The city’s Parking Authority 
solicited bids from consultants to explore 
the potential for privatization, charging the 
consultants not only with identifying the 
plan that would “yield the best return … on 
assets” but also with evaluating a plan that 
would “provide the most efficient means of 
providing public parking.”101
In April, the Parking Authority, having 
received bids from and interviewed various 
consultants, selected a winning vendor and 
charged it with exploring various options 
for monetizing the value of the garages 
including, but not limited to, privatiza-
tion.102 In July, the City Council adopted 
a five-year budget blueprint that includes 
privatization of the garages, but that docu-
ment leaves the city’s options open, notes 
that detailed study of the idea is ongoing, 
and suggests that the city could also retain 
the garages but increase rates instead.103 
By contrast, Chicago reportedly be-
gan working with financial advisors to 
explore the prospects of a parking meter 
privatization deal four months before word 
of the idea was first leaked to the media 
and eight months before the city issued a 
request for qualifications from bidders.104 
Other options besides full privatization 
were apparently never seriously considered.
The Pittsburgh experience with garage 
privatization, while far from complete, 
shows that cities can explore privatization 
in a transparent and thoughtful way, pro-
viding the public with openings to make 
its voice heard.
Policy Recommendations to 
Improve Chicago’s Privatization 
Process
The best way not to repeat the mistakes 
that led to Chicago’s parking meter priva-
tization debacle is to ensure that all future 
privatization proposals in Chicago are sub-
jected to a clear, thorough and transparent 
process of evaluation that includes public 
participation. Specifically, the city should 
adopt requirements for significant future 
privatization proposals (those greater than 
$1 million) that include the following:
• Requiring a minimum waiting period 
of 30 days between publication of the 
final terms of the agreement and a 
vote on an infrastructure deal (45 days 
for privatization of assets or services 
valued at more than $50 million). 
• Competitive bidding for all profes-
sional services provided during the 
privatization process and for the  
privatization contract itself.
• Thorough, independent analysis of 
the valuation of assets proposed for 
concession agreements along with 
a comparison of privatization with 
other alternatives (including bonding 
against future revenues while keeping 
the asset public and contracting out 
management tasks without transfer-
ring ownership). 
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• Clear directions for how proceeds 
from the sale will be allocated, along 
with the development of tools to 
enable the public to track spending 
of proceeds from privatization over 
time. These tracking tools should be 
integrated into a city-wide budget 
transparency Web site that would en-
able citizens to have “one-stop” access 
to all city expenditures.
• Timely public disclosure of all docu-
ments relevant to a privatization 
proposal, including posting of such 
documents on a publicly accessible 
Web site.
The Bigger Picture:  
A More Transparent and  
Accountable Government
The lack of transparency that surrounded 
the city’s privatization efforts is sadly 
typical of the way Chicago informs and 
involves ordinary citizens in governance. 
Transparency—particularly in the criti-
cal areas of government contracting and 
spending—is a critical tool for preventing 
corruption, boosting public confidence 
in government, and ensuring f iscal 
responsibility. 
While Chicago has made some steps 
in recent years to provide greater public 
access to government information—in-
cluding government contracts—the city 
still requires citizens to work very hard to 
find the information they are looking for. 
Sometimes the information the public is 
looking for isn’t even there. For example, 
the contracts between the city and the 
firm advising the city on the parking 
meter privatization deal were not initially 
available on the city Department of Pro-
curement Services Web site, reportedly 
because the contracts were issued by the 
city’s budget office, and not through the 
procurement process.105 
The Internet provides a host of new 
opportunities for citizens to find out about 
government operations and become in-
volved in city governance. Unfortunately, 
Chicago’s on-line government informa-
tion services are typical of those of the 
first generation of Internet government 
transparency efforts (Transparency 1.0), 
when posting City Council proceedings or 
budgets in PDF format on a Web site was a 
big improvement over having to ferret out 
hard copies from a local library. 
Transparency 1.0 governments are char-
acterized by on-line information sources 
that are:
•	 Incomplete: Citizens have access to 
only limited information about public 
expenditures. For example, until 
recently, the city of Chicago provided 
only limited information about funds 
generated through tax increment 
financing (TIF) districts.
•	 Scattered: Determined citizens must 
visit numerous agency Web sites or 
make public records requests to gather 
information on government expendi-
tures, including contracts, subsidies 
and special tax breaks.
•	 Provide Tools for Informed Insid-
ers: Researchers who already know 
what they are looking for and under-
stand the structure of government 
programs can dig through reports for 
data buried through layers of subcat-
egories and jurisdictions.
By contrast, a growing number of 
“Transparency 2.0” governments are 
arming citizens with new tools to learn 
about government spending and opera-
tions. These governments provide tools 
that are:
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•	 Comprehensive: A user-friendly Web 
portal provides citizens the ability to 
search detailed information about gov-
ernment contracts, spending, subsidies 
and tax expenditures. 
•	 One-stop: Citizens can search all 
government expenditures on a single 
Web site.
•	 One-click searchable: Citizens can 
search data with a single query or 
browse common-sense categories. 
Citizens can sort data on government 
spending by recipient, amount,  
legislative district, granting agency, 
purpose, or keyword.
Who Is Getting It Right?
In 29 states, citizens now or will soon have 
access to searchable Web sites with detailed 
information on state expenditures. (See 
Figure 2.) 
The state of Illinois recently joined this 
list of states with the launch of its Trans-
parency & Accountability Web site (www.
accountability.illinois.gov). The Web site 
allows users to review payments from gov-
ernment agencies by agency, function and 
vendor. (See Figure 3, see page 37.)
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Table 1. Transparency 2.0 is Comprehensive, One-Stop, One-Click Budget  
Accountability and Accessibility
Transparency 2.0
Comprehensive: User-friendly Web por-
tal provides citizens the ability to search 
detailed information about government 
contracts, spending, subsidies, and tax 
expenditures.
One-Stop:  Citizens can search all govern-
ment expenditures on a single Web site.
 
One-Click Searchable: Citizens can search 
data with a single query or browse com-
mon-sense categories.  Citizens can sort 
data on government spending by recipi-
ent, amount, legislative district, granting 
agency, purpose, or keyword.
36 Privatization and the Public Interest
The initial start-up cost of transparency 
Web sites varies—some states have been 
able to pay for development of the sites 
out of existing resources, while others have 
spent in the neighborhood of $30,000 to 
$300,000.106 
Local governments have been slower 
to implement transparency Web sites, but 
several are now moving in that direction. 
New York City has launched an online 
“Stimulus Tracker,” which provides details 
about the cost and status of projects un-
dertaken through the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (though not specific 
contracts issued for those projects). The 
Web site even includes a clickable map to 
identify stimulus projects by neighbor-
hood. (See Figure 4.)
Some local governments—even small 
ones—have taken the first step toward 
greater transparency by placing their city 
check registers online in PDF format, al-
lowing residents to find out exactly how 
their tax dollars are being spent.107
Chicago can and should be a leader in 
providing information on government 
budgeting, spending and contracts to the 
public. The city’s roughly $6 billion annual 
budget is comparable to that of states such 
as Rhode Island that have implemented 
transparency Web sites. Moreover, invest-
ing in greater transparency can help Chi-
cago transcend its long-time reputation for 
backroom politics and corruption—help-
ing to position the city as an innovator in 
local governance. 
Figure 2. States with “Transparency 2.0” Online Transparency Tools
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Policy Recommendations for  
accountability.illinois.gov
Employees
Search By Agency for Employees
Search By Employee Name
Search By Position Title
Employees FAQ
Expenditures
Search By Agency for Expenditures
Search by Category
Search By Contracts
Search By Vendor
Expenditures FAQ
Site Information
Corporate
Accountability
Professional Licenses
Home
Fiscal Year (ending June 30th):
Search By Agency for Expenditures
Home Expenditures Agency
Agency payments for Fiscal Year 2010
Click on an agency name to view payments for the agency by category. (57 item(s) returned)
Group Agency Name Payments Total
DEPARTMENTS AGING $93,698,155.64
DEPARTMENTS AGRICULTURE $819,719.06
OTHER AGENCIES CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD $11,289,843.23
DEPARTMENTS CENTRAL MANAGEMENT $14,893,733.63
DEPARTMENTS CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES $88,375,912.84
OTHER AGENCIES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION $11,187.60
DEPARTMENTS COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUN $35,120,190.72
OTHER AGENCIES COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS $5,559.63
DEPARTMENTS CORRECTIONS $18,989,385.74
OTHER AGENCIES COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISAB $92,365.71
OTHER AGENCIES COURT OF CLAIMS $2,150,317.95
OTHER AGENCIES DEAF & HARD OF HEARING COMM $16,020.45
OTHER AGENCIES DRYCLEANER COUNCIL $152,476.15
OTHER AGENCIES E ST. LOUIS FINANCE ADVIS AUTH $1,186.38
DEPARTMENTS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY $18,536,143.24
OTHER AGENCIES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECT AGENCY $22,791,962.59
OTHER AGENCIES EXECUTIVE ETHICS COMMISSION $2,923.43
DEPARTMENTS FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REG $843,400.93
OTHER AGENCIES GOVERNOR'S OFF OF MGT & BUDGET $32,921,779.37
OTHER AGENCIES GUARDIAN & ADVOCACY COMM $55,536.39
Governor Pat Quinn
ITAP | Search By Agency for Expenditures http://www.accountability.illinois.gov/Expenditures/Agency/Default.aspx
1 of 2 8/27/2009 11:23 AM
Figure 3. Illinois’s Transparency & Accountability Web Page
Search | Email Updates | Contact Us
Residents Business Visitors Government Office of the Mayor
NYCityMap FEEDBACK FORM USER GUIDE DISCLAIMER
Search for a Location
Find
SEARCH TYPE
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BOROUGH
ϛ
NYCityMap • DoITT • City-Wide GIS http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/nycitymap/?featureTypes=STIMULUS
1 of 1 8/27/2009 11:39 AM
Figure 4. New York City’s Stimulus Tracker Web Site
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Increasing Government  
Transparency in Chicago
The city should create a one-stop, compre-
hensive, on-line database that would enable 
citizens to obtain information on con-
tracts, the current status of city accounts, 
special tax breaks, economic development 
subsidies and city budgets. The Web site 
should provide summary information and 
enable residents to drill down to detailed 
information on city payments, including 
the city’s check register. The Web site 
should also retain previous years’ data for 
comparison. 
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State Web Address
Alabama open.alabama.gov/
Alaska fin.admin.state.ak.us/dof/checkbook_online/index.jsp
Arizona To be operational by January 1, 2011
California www.reportingtransparency.ca.gov/
Colorado tops.state.co.us/ 
 expenditure info by Sept. 1 and revenue info by Jan 1., 2010
Florida myfloridacfo.com/transparency/
Georgia open.georgia.gov/
Hawaii hawaii.gov/spo2/source/
Illinois accountability.illinois.gov/ 
Kansas kansas.gov/kanview/
Kentucky opendoor.ky.gov
Louisiana doa.louisiana.gov/LaTrac/index.cfm
Maryland spending.dbm.maryland.gov/
Minnesota mmb.state.mn.us/tap
Mississippi merlin.state.ms.us/ 
Missouri mapyourtaxes.mo.gov/MAP/portal/
Nebraska nebraskaspending.com/
Nevada open.nv.gov
New York openbooknewyork.com/index.htm
North Carolina ncopenbook.gov/
North Dakota To be operational June 30, 2011
Oklahoma ok.gov/okaa
Oregon planned to be operational January 1, 2010
Rhode Island ri.gov/opengovernment/
South Carolina https://ssl.sc.gov/SpendingTransparency/Budget 
 TransparencyMain.aspx
Texas  window.state.tx.us/comptrol/expendlist/cashdrill.php
Utah utah.gov/transparency/
Virginia datapoint.apa.virginia.gov/
Washington fiscal.wa.gov/
Appendix A: 
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